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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent/ 
-vs-
DEAN KEITH HICKMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is pursuant to Rule 3 
and Rule 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Statement of Issues raised on appeal are whether 
the plea of guilty entered by the Defendant/Appellant was involun-
tary and inappropriately taken by the Trial Court/ and that the 
Defendant/Appellant was also not appropriately advised within 
Boykin v. Alabama/ 395 U.S. 238, 243, 244 (1969), Brady v. United 
States/ 397 U.S. 742 (1970), State v. Gibbons, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 
36 (June 30, 1987), and State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah 
App. 1988) Cert, denied (9-21-88). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
That the above named Defendant/Appellant filed a motion 
to withdraw his plea of guilty in July, 1988. The Defendant/ 
Appellant is in belief that the Honorable Scott Daniels, presiding 
judge of the Third Judicial District Court, erred by not informing 
the Defendant/Appellant of all the consequences involved in the 
entrance and acceptance of such a plea of guilty on January 18, 
BKJ.iSJr UJ? At?r&Ll*AN'±' 
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1985. Furthermore, the Trial Court failed to comply with the Utah 
Code of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e), Section 77-35-11, Pleas 
(e)(4)(6)(f), when it accepted the Defendant/Appellant's plea of 
guilty to the charge of aggravated robbery, a felony of the first 
degree. 
SUMMARY ARGUMENT 
The Defendant/Appellant, by virtue of the following 
conviction obtained and entered against him as a result of a plea 
bargain agreement, resulting in the entrance and acceptance of a 
plea of guilty before the Honorable Scott Daniels, presiding judge 
of the Third Judicial District Court, in criminal case number 
CR-84-1436, for the crime of aggravated robbery, a felony of the 
first degree, on January 18, 1985. 
Also, on January 18, 1985, the Defendant/Appellant 
was sentenced by the same aforementioned Court to serve a term of 
imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for no less than five years 
and no more than life in criminal case number CR-84-1436, for the 
crime of aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree. 
ARGUMENT 
That the Honorable Scott Daniels, presiding judge of the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for the county of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, erred in his acceptance of the guilty plea entered 
by the Defendant/Appellant in criminal case number CR-84-1436, in 
count number 3^, for the crime of aggravated robbery, a felony of 
the first degree. The Utah Code of Criminal Procedure only allows 
for the following under Section 77-35-11, Rule 11 - Pleas (e)(4) 
(6)(f) of the statute, and the pertinent part states: 
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(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest/ and shall not accept such a 
plea until the court has made the findings: 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is entering 
the plea; that upon trial the prosecution would 
have the burden of proving each of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of 
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement and/ if 
so, what agreement has been reached. If it appears 
that the prosecuting attorney or any other party 
has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance 
of a plea to a lessor included offense, or the dis-
missal of other charges/ the same shall be approved 
by the court. If the recommendations as to the 
sentence are allowed by the court/ the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommend-
ation as to the sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea 
discussions prior to any agreement being made by 
the prosecuting attorney/ but once a tentative 
plea agreement has been reached which contemplates 
entry of a plea in the expectation that other charges 
will be dropped or dismissed/ the judge/ upon request 
of parties/ may permit the disclosure to him of 
such tentative agreement and the reasons therefore 
in advance of the time for tender of plea. The 
judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney 
and defense counsel whether he will approve the 
proposed disposition. Should (it) not be handled 
in conformity with the plea agreement/ he shall so 
advise the defendant and then call upon the defend-
ant to either affirm or withdraw his plea. (1983) 
Also/ the Utah Code of Rules of Practice only allows for 
the following under Rule 3.6/ Pleas of Guilty/ which states in 
the pertinent part: 
Upon entry of a plea of guilty to a criminal 
charge/ before acceptance thereof/ there must be 
substantial compliance with the following: 
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(A) Admonition of Defendant 
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty 
without first making certain that the defendant 
understands the following: 
[1] The nature of the charge . 
[2] The minimum and maximum sentence prescribed 
by law, including when applicable, the penalty to 
which jthe defendant may be subject, including any 
consecutive sentences, if given., 
[3] That the defendant has a right to plead 
not guilty, or to persist in that plea if it has 
already been made, or to plead guilty; 
(B) Determining Whether the Plea Is Voluntary 
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty 
without first determining that the plea is voluntay, 
if the tendered plea is a result of a plea agreement, 
the agreement shall be stated and confirmed in open 
court. The court shall determine whether any force 
or threats or any promises, apart from a plea 
agreement, were used to obtain the plea. 
(C) Determining Factual Basis for Plea 
The court shall not enter final judgement on 
a plea of guilty without first determining that 
there is factual basis for the plea, and that all 
requirements of law for acceptance of a plea of 
guilty have been met. 
(D) Use of Affidavit of Defendant 
The court may establish the foregoing require-
ments in the record by use of a written affidavit 
executed by the defendant before the court, the 
substance of which shall be in substantially the 
form as contained in the "affidavit of defendant" 
form. 
The Addendum copy of the "affidavit of defendant" dated 
on January 18, 1985, clearly shows that the Honorable Scott Daniels, 
presiding judge of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
the county of Salt Lake, State of Utah, erred in his acceptance 
of the guilty plea entered by the Defendant/Appellant as previously 
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stated above. It was the responsibility of the Trial Court to 
notify the Defendant/Appellant of all the facts and the consequences 
the Defendant/Appellant would face on the entrance of a plea of 
guilty within the meaning of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure/ 
Section 77-35-11, Rule 11 - Pleas (e)(4)(6)(f), and also under 
the Utah Code of Rules of Practice/ Rule 3.6/ Pleas of Guilty (A) 
(B)(C)(D), and finally/ the effect and the consequences the 
Defendant/Appellant's plea of guilty would have upon him at the 
time of sentencing. 
A plea of guilty must be entered into freely/ 
voluntarily and understandingly by one fully comp-
etent and aware of the consequences thereof. Such 
a plea of guilty must be entered free from threats/ 
promises and inducements. 
The record in the instant case at bar clearly establishes/ 
as shown in the attached copy of the "affidavit of defendant/" 
that the Defendant/Appellant's plea of guilty was entered 
involuntarily as a result of the Trial Court's error/ by failing 
to comply with the appropriate statutes of state law concerning 
the acceptance of guilty pleas/ including inducements/ and promises 
as well as threats. 
The following exchange occurred between the Honorable 
Scott Daniels/ presiding judge of the Third Judicial District Court/ 
and the Defendant/Appellant at the Defendant/Appellant's change 
of plea hearing on January 18/ 1985/ as follows: 
THE COURT: We'll return, then, to State of Utah 
verses Dean Keith Hickman. 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, Brooke Wells appearing on 
behalf of Mr. Hickman who is present. 
THE COURT: All right. Are you Mr. Dean Keith 
Hickman? 
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MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to talk with 
your attorney, Ms. Wells, before the hearing? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yeahe 
THE COURT: And are you ready to enter a plea at 
this time? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Is there going — 
MS. WELLS: There will be a plea that we will ask 
the Court to accept, Your Honor. At this time we 
are asking the Court to accept Mr. Hickmanfs plea 
to Count III of the Information which is presently 
before it. That will be a plea of guilty to Count 
III, which is Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree 
Felony. In exchange for Mr. Hickman's plea of 
guilty, we anticipate that the State will do the 
following. 
First, that is will amend the information that 
is presently before the Court to indicate that the 
aggravated robbery, which Mr. Hickman is entering 
a plea to, would have been committed with a deadly 
weapon, but will not specify that weapon was a 
firearm. My affidavit so indicates at this time. 
We also anticipate that the State will move to 
dismiss Counts I and II of the Information before 
it. That the State will file no other cases present-
ly known to it. And that another case which was — 
preliminary hearing was held at the same time this 
one was out of West Valley City, will be dismissed. 
Unfortunately because I was in trial, I don't have 
that other file number with me. It has not come 
up for arraignment in the District Court. But I 
think we can be specific enought about it on the 
affidavit that we know which case it is. 
UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I can give you the Circuit Court-— 
MS. WELLS: Perhaps the Circuit Court number would, 
at least— 
MR. D'ELIA: Your Honor, on that, our office is in 
the process of looking it up, was going to call to 
give the District Court number. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you a few questions, 
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then, Mr. Hickman. As I understand it, you're 
going to plead guilty to the charge of Aggravated 
Robbery, a First Degree Felony. If I have it right, 
that is punishable by a maximum sentence of a life 
sentence no less than five, no more than life in 
the Utah State Penitentiary and a fine of $15,000. 
MS. WELLS: Ten thousand dollars. 
THE COURT: Ten thousand dollars or both, the fine 
and the prison sentence. And even though they are 
amending their complaint to delete the language 
about the firearm, I suppose he could be sentenced— 
MS. WELLS: No, Your Honor, that is the reason for 
the amendment at this time. The statute states that 
where a firearm is used, that there is a mandatory 
enhancement which this Court must sentence the 
Defendant to. We are asking the Court to accept the 
State's amendment to avoid that enhancement clause, 
and that's the reason for the amendment. 
THE COURT: But isn't the sentence based on whether 
a firearm is used, not on what the State charges 
in the Information? 
MS. WELLS: I don't believe so. And that would be 
based upon proof that may or may not have come out 
at the preliminary hearing. But where the State 
amends that, it would be similar to our being in-
volved in some of the minimum manadtory cases 
charging sexual offenses. If the State amends out 
the language which requires the minimum mandatory 
or in this case the enhancement, then the Court, I 
don't believe, has that privilege. Is that your 
understanding? 
MR. D'ELIA: Your Honor, that's my understanding, if 
a firearm is not specifically alleged, Your Honor, 
over to a deadly weapon, the enhancement— 
THE COURT: All right. So you could be sentenced to 
as much as five in [sic] life in the Utah State 
Penitentiary, $10,000. fine, plus any restitution, 
if there's any damage caused. Do you understand 
that's a possibility? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And even though whatever your attorney 
may have told you about, advice she may have given 
you, or what the County attorneys agreed to recommend, 
none of those agreements are binding on me, and I 
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might give you the full sentence. Do you under-
stand that's a possibility? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And that if I did give you the full 
sentence, then you decided it wasn't a good idea to 
plead guilty, it would be too late* You couldn't 
withdraw your plea anyway. Do you understand that? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, you're not under — today 
under the influence of any drugs, alcohol or anything 
of that nature? 
MR. HICKMAN: No, sir, 
THE COURT: Taking any medication of any kind? 
MR. HICKMAN: No. 
THE COURT: Nothing that would affect your judgement 
in that way? 
MR. HICKMAN: No, not that I know of. 
THE COURT: You understand if you plead not guilty, 
you have a constitutional right to a trial by jury. 
We would bring the jury in here. I'd tell them 
that you are innocent until proven guilty. You'd 
be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The 
State has the burden of proving you are guilty, have 
to prove every element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. They'd have — the jury would 
have to agree unanimously that you were guilty 
before you could be found guilty. 
You'd have your attorney with you all through 
the trial, question any witnesses that the State 
produced. You could bring in witnesses if you wanted 
to. You could testify on your own behalf if you 
wanted to. You have all those rights. Do you under-
stand that? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And then by pleading guilty, it's — 
you waive all those rights so you are found guilty 
the same as if the jury found you guilty of Aggra-
vated Robbery. Do you understand that? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
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THE COURT: Let me — I want you to understand what 
the elements of the offense are/ make sure you 
know what they'd have to prove. 
They would have to prove that in Salt Lake 
County at about 965 South 2200 East/ on or about 
November 1st/ 1984/ you unlawfully and intentionally 
took personal property in possession of A. W. Kelson 
or from his immediate person by threatening with 
some sort of a deadly weapon. Theyfd have to prove 
it was in Salt Lake County. They'd have to prove 
the date/ prove you did it to A. W. Kelson. All 
those things they have to prove/ all the elements 
that are read. Do you understand that? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Is the reason that 
you are pleading guilty of this charge because you 
are guilty of it? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. What's your level of education? 
MR. HICKMAN: Twelfth. 
THE COURT: And having finished twelfth grade, can 
you read and understand the English language? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have you had a chance to read that affi-
davit? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. And do you understand what it says? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to sign it? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And do you have any questions about it 
before you do? 
MR. HICKMAN: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. You can go ahead and sign it, then. 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, I would ask that the State 
make the Motion to amend that count — 
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MR. D'ELIA: Whenever you are ready/ Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
MR. D'ELIA: The State would move at this time to 
amend Count III by crossing out on the third line 
up where it says a firearm, from that point/ 
firearm/ all the way through and substitute a deadly 
weapon by delineation. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. D'ELIA: And also to dismiss Counts I and II 
as pertains to Mr. Hickman, Mr. Dean Hickman/ as 
party to the offense. And with respect to the other 
charges/ as Ms. Wells represented/ we would stipulate 
that that's the agreement, no other charges in 
connection with this offense will be filed. 
THE COURT: The Motion will be granted. 
Let me ask you Mr. Hickman, after everything 
we've said, you still want to plead guilty to this? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And then, let me ask you, how do you 
plead to the charge of Aggravated Robbery, a First 
Degree Felony, guilty or not guilty? 
MR. HICKMAN: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Okay. You can go ahead and sign that 
affidavit. 
MS. WELLS: He has signed it. Your Honor, in open 
court. I would also indicate Mr. D'Elia has, and 
I have also signed the affidavit. 
THE COURT: Based on the questions I asked Mr. Hickman, 
I find it's a plea entered freely and voluntarily, 
and I'm accepting the plea and signing the affidavit. 
It's my duty to sentence you in a time not sooner 
than two or later than 30 days unless those time 
periods are waived by you. What's your pleasure 
in that regard? 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, we would waive the minimum 
and ask the Court to impose sentence today. The 
Court may or may not know Mr. Hickman is presently 
on probation for a felony offense to Judge Banks. 
An Order to Show Cause has been filed in that matter, 
and we will be indicating to Judge Banks that this 
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plea will have been entered. Based upon that, we 
feel that there is no real benefit to be gained 
from asking for a pre-sentence report, and we would 
ask the Court to impose sentence today, understand-
ing that the Court would have no alternative but to 
impose the statutory period of time. 
MR. D'ELIA: That would be the request from the 
State to impose the maximum sentence. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sentence you, Mr. Hickman, 
to serve a term in the Utah State Penitentiary of 
not less than five years nor longer than life, to 
be transported there forewith, I suppose. 
MS. WELLS: One other matter. At the time both 
brothers, Hickman, were arrested, certain pieces 
of personal property, their clothing, were taken 
into evidence. I would ask the Court for an order 
releasing that either to them for transportation to 
the Utah State Prison with them or to a person of 
their choice since this is personal property, 
just items of personal property and clothing. 
MR. D'ELIA: No objection to personal items. 
THE COURT: That will be the Order. 
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
* * * 
Again, the above exchange between the Trial Court and 
the Defendant/Appellant clearly shows from a silent record that 
the Honorable Scott Daniels erred in his acceptance of the guilty 
plea entered by the Defendant/Appellant on January 18, 1985. It 
was the Trial Court's responsibility to notify the Defendant/ 
Appellant of all the facts involved and the consequences the 
Defendant/Appellant would face on the entrance of a plea of guilty, 
and also the involved consequences of his guilty plea at the time 
of sentencing and the effect that is would have upon the Defendant/ 
Appellant within the meaning of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 
Section 77-35-11, Rule 11 - Pleas (e)(4)(6)(f), and also under the 
Utah Code of Rules of Practice, Rule 3.6, Pleas of Guilty(A)(B)(C)(D). 
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The Trial Court further violated the Defendant/Appellant's civil 
rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, under the authority of Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238 (1969), Brady v. United States, 397 U.S 742 (1970), 
State v. Gibbons, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 37, 38 (June 30, 1987), 
and State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah 1988). 
The Defendant/Appellant should not have been allowed to 
have pled guilty in criminal case number CR-84-1436, in count 
number III, for the crime of aggravated robbery, a felony of the 
first degree. There was no factual basis for a plea of guilty to 
be entered by the Defendant/Appellant to a charge of aggravated 
robbery, a felony of the first degree, because, in fact, there was 
no property actually taken. 
In State of Utah vs. Boyd Keith Hickman, in criminal 
case number CR-84-1436, in which happens to be the above named 
Defendant/Appellant's brother, charge with the same crime, it 
clearly states the following for the record in his transcript of 
hearing with respect to the taking of his guilty plea on page j5 of 
the transcript: 
MR. FRATTO: Let me interject. I think he may 
hesitate, no property was actually taken. I think 
the statute allows — in fact, I'm sure it allows 
the attempt to do such a thing — 
THE COURT: Also — 
MR. FRATTO: — to use force and firearm to a robbery. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. FRATTO: So they weren't perfectly clear, there 
was no property actually taken. (Tp 8) 
The above exchange that occurred between the Trial Court and the 
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Defendant/Appellant's brother/ Boyd Keith Hickman, clearly shows 
in the instant case that the Defendant/Appellant's plea of guilty 
could not or should not have been accepted by the Trial Court to 
the crime of aggravated robbery/ a felony of the first degree. 
The record as a whole clearly demonstrates that the elements in 
the instant case at bar were not that of aggravated robbery/ when 
there is clearly shown by the record that no property was actually 
taken as previously stated above. 
Under the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 1986-1987, 
under Section 76-4-102/ Attempt/ Classification of Offenses/ it 
allows for the following: 
CRIMINAL ATTEMPT TO COMMIT: 
(2) A felony of the first degree is a felony 
of the second degree; 
The above clearly shows that the offense in the instant case at 
bar is one of attempted robbery/ a felony of the second degree/ as 
where there was no property taken. 
Under the Utah Code, 1986-1987, it allows for the follow-
ing with respect to Section 78-7-5/ Powers of Every Court/ which 
states in the pertinent part: 
(8) To amend and control its process and 
orders so as to make them conformable to law and 
justice. 
The above clearly shows that this Court has the power to correct 
an alleged error, and to furthermore change a sentence, to make it 
conformable to law and justice. 
The Defendant/Appellant's brother, in State of Utah vs. 
Boyd Keith Hickman, in criminal case number CR-84-1436, also moved 
to withdraw his plea of guilty on the same identical grounds as 
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the Defendant/Appellant in the instant case now seeks to do. As 
previously stated by the Trial Court in State of Utah vs. Boyd 
Keith Hickman/ the same would hold true in the Defendant/Appellant's 
case presently pending review by this Honorable Court. The 
following memoradum decision was given by the Trial Court on 
January 7, 1988, concerning the validity of the defendant's guilty 
plea in State of Utah vs. Boyd Keith Hickman, in criminal case 
number CR-84-1436, which states in the pertinent part: 
This matter is before the court on Mr. Hickman's 
motion to revise his sentence from a second degree 
felony to a third degree felony. After reading the 
transcript of the change of plea, I am of the view 
that a sufficient factual basis was not established 
for either a plea of simple robbery, a second degree 
felony, or attempted aggravated robbery, a second 
degree felony. A factual basis was not established 
for the use of a firearm, which would have been 
required for the attempted aggravated robbery charge. 
I do not believe this amounts to an illegal 
sentence, however. Rather, it amounts to an improp-
erly taken guilty plea. Consequently, a proper 
procedure would be for Mr. Hickman to file a motion 
to withdraw his plea of guilty under Utah Code Ann., 
Section 77-13-6. 
If Mr. Hickman desires to withdraw his guilty 
plea and entirely rescind the plea bargain, he should 
do so. 
DATED this 2 d aY o f January, 1988. 
Scott Daniels 
District Court Judge 
On February 26, 1988, the above naAed' defendant, Boyd 
Keith Hickman, appeared before the Trial Court and withdrew his 
plea of guilty based upon the aforementioned memorandum decision 
of that Honorable Court, dated on January 7, 1988. The same should 
hold true in the instant case of this Defendant/Appellant, as the 
record clearly shows that a factual basis was not found to support 
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the Defendant/Appellant's plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated 
robbery, a felony of the first degree. And further, the Trial 
Court erred in its acceptance of such a plea of guilty to a charge 
of aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree. 
The Defendant/Appellant above named is in belief that 
this Honorable Court may grant relief additionally, pursuant to 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, pursuant to the following 
Articles and Sections, which state in the pertinent parts: 
Article I, Section 1, Declaration of Rights: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liber-
ties; and petition for redress of grievances; to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Article I, Section 7, Due Process of Law: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 11, Courts Open-Redress of 
Injuries: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course 
of law. 
Article I, Section 26, Provisions Mandatory and 
Prohibitory: 
The provisions of this constitution are 
mandatory and prohibitory, unless be express words 
they are declared to be otherwise. 
Article I, Section 27, Fundamental Rights: 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles 
is essential to the security of individual rights 
and the perpetuity of free government. 
The above cited pertinent parts of the Utah Constitution are, in 
fact, relevant to the Defendant's instant case at bar, and are 
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furthermore guaranteed to the Defendant/Appellant under Utah 
Constitutional Law. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore/ in conclusion of the facts as set forth above/ 
the Defendant/Appellant now respectfully requests that this Honor-
able Court reverse the decision of the Trial Court and allow the 
Defendant/Appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty as prayed for 
herein. 
DATED on this ^  ^/) day of October, 1988. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
DEAN KEITH HICKMAN 
Defendant/Appellant 
Attorney Pro Se 
Post Office Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have caused four (4) true and 
correct photocopies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this ^ u day of October, 1988, 
(1) DAVID YOKUM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
)EAN KEITH/HICKMAN 
Defendant/Appellant 
-16-
A D D E N D U M S 
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in tne District court oi tne lhird Judicial District Leka county Utah 
State of Utah 
b
. JAM 101935 
THE STATE OF UTAH. I / / 
Plaintiff / H- Often H>fciey. Cla* 3r< C&. Csvr 
\J «. 11 , } Affidavit rffttrtfiM"^;^ 
oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of 
(Name of Crime) 
Elements: Facts / 
^(AJLj^mun\f Prio\ <4, QM Hi 
IA)T*.ATri/iA)frn\/ T~0t>kL A2&Q fjfr& 
1/j fiosszsr?cb/o o/= fliuoW/r COt7ttour (taL&zjur fy us?. 
I have received a copy 
and understand the punishment for this crime m 
_ _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ prison term 
She charge (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a 
(Degree of Felony or Class ofMisdemeanor) 
gT v&fl^ To U f t ay be — 
I, T (^ t O / r / V O Tine* or mmAam not on drug! oriRtohoL 
made. I am represented by Attorney k ^ ( - ^ ^ r f c ^ , ^ ^ ^ j L j ^ My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily 
who has explained my rights to me and 1 understand them. 
1 o I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial. I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if! choose not to do so. the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. 1 know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose 
to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if 1 were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that 1 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting 1 am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which 1 have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. 
t. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of guilty does not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will 
be. 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against me, to-wte (Court case numbers) or count(s)): 
will be dismissed? and tnarwo ot^rchargeOs} will be filed against me for other crimes 1 may have committed which jjp fc/cX 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge. 
10. I have~read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I know and understand its contents. I 
am _ £ Z i * d years of age, have attended school through the - _ and 1 can read and 
understand the English language. 
iv&read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by y attorney, and l know 
JLLLZ. years of age, have attended school through the ^ z 
Dated this / & day of 
Defendant 
Subscribed and-sworn to before me in Court this. 
Defendant 
-_£. day of J A A U . ^ 19_S3 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFEdSfc^fcttUkNEY 
Jc Judge 
ilsjmJbsmsAL I certify that I am the attorney for %^tytr^ named above and I know he 
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him/rod I discussed it with him and believe he fully undersunds the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true. 
&.U2s& 
Defense Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: p/j*j//f.l7H Mentor 1 certify that 1 am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against < 
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest. 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. . 
1 2 day of N J C ^ A i,»,r% 19 5 X Done in Court this 
S,<-*xCWlO, 
Distnct Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. CR-84-1436 
vs. : 
BOYD K. HICKMAN, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter is before the Court on Mr. Hickman's Motion to 
Revise his Sentence from a Second Degree Felony to a Third Degree 
Felony. After reading the transcript of the change of plea, I am 
of the view that a sufficient factual basis was not established 
for either a plea to simple Robbery, a second degree felony, or 
Attempted Aggravated Robbery, a second degree felony. A factual 
basis was not established that property was actually taken, which 
would have been required for the Robbery charge; a factual basis 
was not established for the use of a firearm, which would have 
been required for the Attempted Aggravated Robbery charge. 
I do not believe this amounts to an illegal sentence, 
however. Rather, it amounts to an improperly taken guilty plea. 
Consequently, a proper procedure would be for Mr. Hickman to file 
a Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code Ann., 
Section 77-13-6. It appears that Mr. Hickman has received 
substantial benefit from the guilty plea in that a number of 
STATE V. HICKMAN PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
other charges were dismissed. If Mr. Hickman desires to withdraw 
his guilty plea and entirely rescind the plea bargain, he should 
do so. 
The Motion to Revise the Sentence, however, is denied. The 
attorney for the State of Utah is directed to prepare an 
appropriate Order. 
Dated this -3. dav of January, 1988. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
